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This paper studies the optimal timing of unemployment insurance subsidies in a McCall search
model. Risk-averse workers sequentially sample random job opportunities. Our model distinguishes
unemployment subsidies from consumption during unemployment by allowing workers to save and
borrow freely. When the insurance agency faces a group of homogeneous workers solving stationary
search problems, the optimal subsidies are independent of unemployment duration. In contrast, when
workers are heterogeneous or when human capital depreciates during the spell, the optimal subsidy
is no longer constant. We explore the main determinants of the shape of the optimal subsidy
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The goal of this paper is to develop a test for the optimal level of unemployment insurance
using a minimal amount of economic theory and a minimal amount of data. We approach this
by studying a risk-averse worker in a sequential job search setting (McCall, 1970). Our main
theoretical insight is that the worker’s after-tax reservation wage—the diﬀerence between her
reservation wage and the tax needed to fund the unemployment insurance system—encodes
all of the relevant information about her welfare. This is true regardless of whether workers
are able to borrow and lend to smooth their consumption or whether they must must live
hand-to-mouth.
The intuition is clear: the after-tax reservation wage tells us the take-home pay required
to make a worker indiﬀerent between working and remaining unemployed. Since take-home
pay translates directly into consumption, it is a valid measure of the worker’s utility. Given
the simplicity of the argument, it should not be surprising that this insight turns out to be
robust to several variations of our basic model.
To prove this result, we develop a formal dynamic model of job search with risk-aversion.
Workers draw wages from a known distribution and accepted jobs last for a ﬁxed amount
of time. In order to abstract from wealth eﬀects, we assume workers have constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA) preferences.1 We ﬁrst consider how workers behave when confronted
by an arbitrary level of unemployment beneﬁts and reemployment taxes and show how the
answer depends on whether workers are able to borrow and lend. In both cases we ﬁnd that
a worker’s utility while unemployed is a monotone function of her after-tax reservation wage.
If she has no access to capital markets, her unemployment utility, measured in consumption
equivalent units, is equal to her after-tax reservation wage. If she can borrow and lend, it is
equal to her after-tax reservation wage plus the annuity value of her assets. This implies that
optimal unemployment insurance—the policy of an agency which chooses unemployment
beneﬁts and reemployment taxes to maximize an unemployed worker’s utility subject to
the expected discounted cost of the unemployment insurance equally zero—simply seeks to
maximize workers’ after tax reservation wage.
This insight leads to a novel test for the optimality of unemployment insurance: raising
beneﬁts is desirable whenever it raises the after-tax reservation wage. This criteria can be
1 In Shimer and Werning (2005), we show that the behavior and insurance needs of a worker with constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences is similar to that of a worker with the same absolute risk aversion
and CARA preferences. Thus we believe that the results we report here are quantitatively reasonable for
more general preferences.
1decomposed into two eﬀects. On the one hand, higher beneﬁts reduce the cost of remaining
unemployed and therefore raise the pre-tax reservation wage. Thus, if the pre-tax reservation
wage is very responsive to unemployment beneﬁts, raising unemployment beneﬁts has a
strong positive eﬀect on workers’ welfare. However, the increase in beneﬁts must be funded
by an increase in the employment tax. The higher is the unemployment rate or the more
responsive it is to unemployment beneﬁts, the greater is the needed increase in the tax. Our
optimality condition nets out both eﬀects.
While a large literature studies the responsiveness of unemployment or unemployment
duration to unemployment beneﬁts (e.g., Meyer, 1990), there is less research on the re-
sponsiveness of reservation wages to beneﬁts. Two notable exceptions are Fishe (1982) and
Feldstein and Poterba (1984). Fishe (1982) uses information on actual wages to infer reser-
vation wages, while Feldstein and Poterba (1984) uses direct survey evidence on reservation
wages. Both papers ﬁnd that a $1 increase in beneﬁts may raise pre-tax reservation wages
by as much as $0.44. Feldstein and Poterba (1984) interpret this as evidence of the moral
hazard cost of raising unemployment beneﬁts, but our approach turns this logic around, since
our theory tells us that the reservation wage measures the welfare of unemployed workers.
If the numbers in Fishe (1982) and Feldstein and Poterba (1984) are correct, we show
that a fully-funded $1 increase in weekly beneﬁts, at a cost of approximately $400 million per
year in the U.S. economy, is equivalent to somehow giving every employed and unemployed
worker an additional $0.37 of consumption per week, i.e. to creating $2.6 billion per year
in additional consumption. Of course, Fishe’s (1982) and Feldstein and Poterba’s (1984)
estimates are valid for small policy changes; according to the model, suﬃciently high unem-
ployment beneﬁts would eventually eliminate all economic activity. Moreover, more recent
estimates of the responsiveness of reservation wages to beneﬁts are smaller and imply that
current beneﬁt levels are too high. In our view, the uncertainty around this critical variable
calls for more precise estimates of it.
Within the public ﬁnance literature, the standard approach to measuring optimal unem-
ployment insurance is based on the Baily (1978) test:
“The optimal unemployment insurance beneﬁt level is set when the proportional
drop in consumption resulting from unemployment, times the degree of relative
risk aversion of workers (evaluated at the level of consumption when unemployed)
is equal to the elasticity of the duration of unemployment with respect to balanced
budget increases in UI [unemployment insurance] beneﬁts and taxes.” (p. 390)
While this approach is close in spirit to the one we adopt here, we see several advantages
2to our test. First, our test is entirely behavioral, while the Baily test requires independent
estimates of risk-aversion. Indeed, Chetty (2005) argues within a Baily framework that the
relevant risk-aversion parameter depends on the context and may be higher for unemploy-
ment risk. In light of such concerns, the fact that our test does not requires selecting this,
or any other, parameter is particularly convenient.
Second, Chetty (2005) shows that in a dynamic environment, the Baily test requires a
long panel data set with information on total consumption. Unfortunately, no such data set
exists, so the best known implementation of the Baily test, Gruber (1997), uses panel data
on food expenditure. There are two main limitations to using food expenditure as a proxy
for total consumption: recent work by Aguiar and Hurst (2005) shows that the link between
food expenditure and food consumption is tenuous because of varying amounts of time spent
in household production; and food consumption is likely to react signiﬁcantly less than total
consumption to income or wealth shocks.2
Third, our exact test is robust to a number of extensions. We allow for the possibility
that a worker’s costly search eﬀort aﬀects the arrival rate of oﬀers, that jobs may diﬀer
both in their wage and in their average tenure length, and that workers are heterogeneous
but there is a single unemployment beneﬁt system. None of these extensions aﬀects our
basic conclusion that the reservation wage is a suﬃcient statistic for the unemployed and
therefore substantially alters our behavioral test for optimal unemployment insurance. In
contrast, although Chetty (2005) shows that extensions of the consumption-based Baily
test are possible, in our view they may be diﬃcult to implement because they require an
empirically challenging comparison of the average marginal utility of consumption during
employment with that during unemployment over the worker’s entire lifetime—a moment
of consumption data not analyzed by Gruber (1997), for example. Nevertheless, our model
can also deliver easily implementable consumption-based tests, but we point out that their
derivation uses the full structure of the model, is less robust than the new test we propose
here, and requires unexplored consumption measures from panel data.
As mentioned above, one challenge to implementing our behavioral test is that empirical
evidence on reservation wages is scarce. Our hope is that this paper, by underscoring its
usefulness as a welfare statistic, may lead to greater interest in reservation wage evidence,
much as Baily’s (1978) theoretical contribution led to empirical research on how much con-
2 Indeed, Chetty (2005) extends the consumption test so that it applies to food consumption. Unfortu-
nately, the test then requires setting a parameter for the curvature of the utility function with respect to
food, instead of risk aversion.
3sumption declines when workers lose their job (Gruber, 1997). Ultimately, the two tests are
complementary. Both assess the optimality of unemployment insurance, but exploit very
diﬀerent data sources.
Macroeconomists have generally taken a diﬀerent approach to optimal unemployment
insurance, calibrating a stochastic general equilibrium model and then performing policy
experiments within the model (Hansen and Imrohoroglu, 1992; Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000;
Alvarez and Veracierto, 2001). An advantage to this approach is that it can address issues
we neglect, such as the impact of unemployment insurance policy on capital accumulation.
But in order to do that, these papers rely heavily on the entire structure of the model and its
calibration, which sometimes obscures the economic mechanisms at work and their empirical
validity. This approach also makes evaluating the robustness of the results expensive. In
contrast, by focusing on the worker’s partial equilibrium problem—a component in richer
general equilibrium models—we are able to highlight, in a tractable way, the main tradeoﬀs
that seem important for understanding optimal unemployment insurance and to point out
how the relevant forces can be measured.
A third strand of the literature focuses on the timing of beneﬁts, and in particular, on
whether unemployment beneﬁts should fall during an unemployment spell (Shavell and Weiss,
1979; Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997). This paper emphasizes the optimal level of beneﬁts
but assumes that beneﬁts and taxes are constant over time. In Shimer and Werning (2005)
we argue that, provided workers are given enough liquidity to easily borrow against future
earnings,3 constant beneﬁts and taxes are optimal, or nearly so. Besides this diﬀerence in
emphasis, there are two modeling diﬀerences. The ﬁrst is that here we work in continuous
time rather than in discrete time, a superﬁcial change that simpliﬁes the algebra. More im-
portantly, here we allow for separations, so that workers experience multiple unemployment
spells. This generalization is important for any quantitative exercise focusing on the level of
beneﬁts.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: The next section presents our model
of sequential search. Section 3 analyzes how workers behave when confronted with constant
unemployment beneﬁts and constant taxes. We consider two ﬁnancial regimes. In the ﬁrst,
workers have unlimited access to borrowing and lending at a constant interest rate, subject
only to a no Ponzi-game condition. In the second, workers must live hand-to-mouth, con-
suming their income in each period. Section 4 describes the problem of an insurance agency
choosing the level of unemployment insurance subject to a budget constraint. Section 5
3 Such liquidity might be provided by unemployment insurance savings accounts (Feldstein, 2005).
4describes our new test for optimal unemployment insurance and discusses the available em-
pirical evidence that bears on the relevant parameters of that test. Section 6 considers
a number of generalizations to our model and shows that our test is unaﬀected by those
changes. Section 7 derives a version of the Baily (1978) test for our model, showing that
the exact test depends on all the details of the model and hence is less robust than our
behavioral test. We conclude in Section 8.
2 Unemployment and Sequential Search







where ρ > 0 represents the subjective discount rate in continuous time. We assume through-
out the body of the paper that the utility function exhibits CARA, u(c) = −e−γc with
coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion γ > 0.
At any moment in time a worker can be employed, at some wage w with t periods
remaining in the job, or unemployed. An employed worker produces a ﬂow of w units
of the single consumption good and pays an employment tax τ. When the job ends, she
becomes unemployed. An unemployed worker receives a beneﬁt b and waits for the arrival
of job opportunities. The worker receives an independent wage draw from a cumulative
distribution function F with Poisson arrival rate λ.4 When a worker gets a wage oﬀer, she
observes the wage and decides whether to accept or reject it. If she accepts, employment
commences immediately and the job lasts for exactly T ≤ ∞ periods.5 If she rejects, she
produces nothing and remains unemployed. The worker cannot recall past wage oﬀers. With
CARA preferences recall is not optimal, so this last assumption is not binding.
There is an unemployment insurance agency whose objective is to maximize an unem-
ployed worker’s utility by choosing a constant unemployment beneﬁt b and constant employ-
ment tax τ,6 subject to the constraint that the expected cost of the unemployment insurance
4 Section 6.4 shows that our results are robust if a worker’s search eﬀort aﬀects the arrival rate of job
oﬀers.
5 Section 6.2 shows that our main results are robust if the worker draws both a wage and a job duration.
Section 6.3 shows they are robust if the duration of a job is uncertain.
6 In Shimer and Werning (2005) we show that this simple unemployment insurance system is optimal
with no job separations when the worker can borrow and lend at interest rate r. With job separations, as
we allow here, this simple policy may not be fully optimal, but it remains an important benchmark.
5system is zero when discounted at the interest rate r = ρ.7 Let B ≡ b + τ denote the net
subsidy to unemployment, the sum of the beneﬁt a worker receives while unemployed and
the employment tax she avoids paying. We show below that a worker’s behavior depends
only on the net unemployment subsidy.
We consider two ﬁnancial environments. In the ﬁrst, the worker has access to ﬁnan-
cial markets, namely a riskless borrowing and savings technology, facing only the budget
constraint
˙ a(t) = ra(t) + y(t) − c(t),
and the usual no Ponzi-game condition.8 Here a(t) is assets, c(t) is consumption, and y(t)
represents current income, equal to the current after-tax wage w(t) − τ if the worker is
employed, or beneﬁts b, otherwise. The rate of return r is the same for the worker and the
unemployment insurance agency and equal to the discount rate ρ for simplicity. In the second
environment, the worker lives hand-to-mouth. She has no access to a savings technology,
a(t) = 0 for all t, and so must consume her income in each period, c(t) = y(t).
We study these two extremes because they span the spectrum of ﬁnancial environments
and because both cases are analytically tractable. The intermediate cases cannot be in solved
in closed form but could be studied numerically to see whether our two cases provide a good










This is the present value of receiving an additional unit of income for the next t periods.
The present value of income from a new job with wage w is αTw. Note that if r = 0, αt = t.
3 Worker Behavior
We start by characterizing how a worker behaves when confronted with any constant beneﬁt
system (b,τ). We ﬁrst consider a worker with no liquidity problems, that is, a worker with
access to borrowing and lending at rate r. We then turn to the opposite end of the spectrum
and consider a hand-to-mouth worker who must consume her current income.
7 Section 6.1 shows that our main results are robust if the discount rate and interest rate are not equal.
8 The no-Ponzi condition states that debt must grow slower than the interest rate, limt→∞ e−rta(t) ≥ 0,
with probability one. Together with the budget constraints ˙ a(t) = ra(t) + y(t) − c(t), this is equivalent to
imposing a single present-value constraint, with probability one.
63.1 Workers with Liquidity
A worker who can borrow and lend at the interest rate r = ρ keeps her consumption constant
during an employment spell since she faces no uncertainty. She saves, however, gradually
accumulating assets while on the job. In contrast, consumption steadily declines during un-
employment, because remaining unemployed represents a negative permanent income shock.
This is accompanied by dissavings, as assets are run down during unemployment spells.
Consumption jumps up when an unemployed worker becomes employed, because ﬁnding a
job is a discrete positive shock. When unemployed, the worker uses a constant reservation
wage policy, accepting jobs above some threshold ¯ w. Finally, the after-tax reservation wage
is a suﬃcient statistic for the welfare of the unemployed.
We now state these results formally:
Proposition 1 Assume a worker has access to ﬁnancial markets. For a given policy (b,τ),




u(ra + ¯ w − τ). (1)
The consumption of an unemployed worker with assets a and of an employed worker with
assets a, t periods remaining on the job, and a wage w are respectively
cu(a) = ra + ¯ w − τ, (2)
c(a,t,w) = r
￿
a + αt(w − ¯ w)
￿
+ ¯ w − τ. (3)
The reservation wage ¯ w is constant and solves








rαT(w − ¯ w)
￿￿
dF(w). (4)
For the purposes of this paper, the most important part of this proposition is equation (1).
To get some intuition for this result, suppose a worker could accept a job at wage w that
lasts forever, so her after-tax income would be w−τ in all future periods. With the discount
rate equal to the interest rate, a worker with a concave utility function u would keep her
consumption constant and so would consume this income plus the annuity value on her assets,
ra. That is, she would consume c(a,∞,w) = ra+w−τ, her assets would be constant, ˙ a = 0,
and her lifetime utility would be 1
ru(ra+w−τ). Now deﬁne the reservation wage ¯ w so that
an unemployed worker without a job oﬀer is indiﬀerent between remaining unemployed and
7working forever at ¯ w, Vu(a) ≡ 1
ru(ra + ¯ w − τ), giving equation (1).
This logic is so simple that it might seem to extend beyond our speciﬁc model. The
catch lies in the notion of a reservation wage. In general, a worker may be willing to accept
a wage for a ﬁnite amount of time but unwilling to take the wage forever. For example, a
worker may take a low wage for a while, accumulate assets, and eventually quit to search for
a higher wage. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) explore this possibility in an environment with
decreasing absolute risk aversion. We prove in Appendix A that this cannot happen with
CARA preferences since a worker’s attitude towards risk and hence her reservation wage is
independent of assets.
3.2 Hand-to-Mouth Workers
We now consider worker behavior under an extreme alternative, ﬁnancial autarky, so a worker
must consume her income in each period: caut
u = b and caut
e (w) = w − τ. Under ﬁnancial
autarky, a worker’s consumption will typically jump up when she ﬁnds a job and down when
she leaves her job. Although this is qualitatively diﬀerent than when the worker has access
to ﬁnancial markets, one critical property is unchanged, the worker’s lifetime utility depends
only on her after-tax reservation wage:
Proposition 2 Assume a worker must consume her income. For a given policy (b,τ), the







aut − τ), (5)
where ¯ waut is the reservation wage, the solution to
u( ¯ w








This result is independent of the form of the period utility function u.
To prove this result, we use a pair of recursive equations. Let V aut
u denote the expected
utility of an unemployed worker living under autarky and let V aut
e (w,T) denote the corre-
8sponding value for a newly-employed worker at a wage w. These solve
ρV
aut






















The ﬂow value of an unemployed worker comes from her current utility u(b). In addition, at
rate λ she gets a wage draw w which she may accept, giving capital gain V aut
e (w,T) − V aut
u ,
or reject. An employed worker in a new job earns u(w −τ) for the next T periods and then
has continuation value V aut
u .
The Bellman equation for a newly-employed worker implies
V
aut









since ρ = r, so the reservation wage solves u( ¯ waut − τ) = ρV aut
u . Equivalently, the lifetime
utility of an unemployed worker is given by equation (5). Substituting this into the Bellman
equation for an unemployed worker gives equation (6) for the reservation wage.
It is worth noting that, since the reservation wage summarizes a worker’s utility both un-
der perfect liquidity and ﬁnancial autarky, the diﬀerence in the reservation wage summarizes
the value of access to ﬁnancial markets. More precisely,
Proposition 3 A hand-to-mouth worker has a lower reservation wage then a worker with
access to capital markets. Moreover, the diﬀerence in their reservation wages is the utility
gain from access to capital markets, measured in units of per-period consumption.
The proof is in Appendix B.
4 Optimal Unemployment Insurance
We now turn to the problem of an unemployment insurance agency which chooses the unem-
ployment beneﬁt b and the employment tax τ to maximize an unemployed worker’s utility.
The agency recognizes that the worker chooses her reservation wage optimally, as described
in the previous section. Thus beneﬁts and taxes aﬀect the expected discounted net cost of
the unemployment insurance agency; we require that this is equal to zero, which turns out
9to be equivalent to
b
λ(1 − F(¯ w))
= αTτ. (7)
The left hand side is the expected cost of unemployment beneﬁts during one unemployment
spell, the value of beneﬁts divided by the hazard rate of ﬁnding an acceptable job. The
right hand side is the product of the reemployment tax and the factor αT, the present
value of a unit of income for the duration of a job. Putting this together, the optimal
unemployment insurance problem is to choose beneﬁts b, taxes τ, and a reservation wage
¯ w to maximize the unemployed worker’s utility given by equation (1) or equation (5), or
equivalently ¯ w − τ, subject to the reservation wage equation (4) or equation (6) and the
budget balance equation (7).
The balanced budget constraint seems natural in a large economy where wage draws are
independent across workers. If all workers are initially unemployed, it should be clear why we
call this optimal unemployment insurance. If some workers start oﬀ employed, however, their
interests are not perfectly aligned with those of unemployed workers since initially-employed
workers pay taxes now and only receive beneﬁts later. That is, if we start with some work-
ers employed and some unemployed, optimal beneﬁt policy has elements of both insurance
and redistribution. To focus on insurance, we implicitly assume that the unemployment
insurance agency does not start taxing workers until they begin their ﬁrst unemployment
spell. Equivalently, we assume the agency has access to lump-sum transfers conditional on
a worker’s initial employment status. Although we do not view this assumption as realis-
tic, it realigns the interests of employed and unemployed workers and allows us to focus on
insurance rather than redistribution.
5 A Behavioral Test
Optimal unemployment beneﬁts maximize a worker’s after-tax reservation wage ¯ w−τ when
the tax is set to balance the budget in equation (7). To see whether this condition holds, all
we need to know is how a balanced-budget increase in taxes and beneﬁts aﬀects a worker’s
after-tax reservation wage. It is not necessary to make any assumptions about risk-aversion,
discount rates, the speed of ﬁnding a job, the duration of a job, the distribution of wage oﬀers,
or about whether workers have liquidity or must consume hand-to-mouth since workers’
utility is a monotone function of the after-tax reservation wage ¯ w − τ.
While this result is theoretically appealing, it may be diﬃcult to implement because it
10may be hard to discern how much taxes must rise to balance an increase in beneﬁts. In
principle this question might be left to a budgetary authority like the Congressional Budget
Oﬃce, but such an organization would still need to understand how much the increase
in beneﬁts raises unemployment duration. Instead, we show that if we can observe how
unemployment beneﬁts aﬀect the pre-tax reservation wage, then we can use information on
the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to beneﬁts to characterize how taxes
must change and hence to characterize optimal policy.
5.1 Theory
Equation (4) or equation (6) implies that the reservation wage depends on unemployment
beneﬁts and taxes, ¯ w(b,τ). It follows that the resource constraint (7) deﬁnes taxes as a
function of beneﬁts,
D(b,τ(b))b = αTτ(b), (8)
where D(b,τ) ≡ 1/λ
￿
1 − F(¯ w(b,τ))
￿
is the expected duration of an unemployment spell.






where subscripts denote partial derivatives. With CARA utility and either perfect liquidity
or hand-to-mouth consumption, the reservation wage and hence unemployment duration
depends only on the sum of beneﬁts and taxes (see equation 4 and equation 6, respectively),
so Db = Dτ. Then letting εD,b ≡ bDb(b,τ)/D(b,τ) be the the elasticity of unemployment






Next, since unemployment beneﬁts should maximize ¯ w(b,τ(b))−τ(b), a necessary condition
for optimal beneﬁts is
¯ wb(b,τ(b)) + ¯ wτ(b,τ(b))τ
′(b) = τ
′(b),
where as usual subscripts denote partial derivatives. Again, ¯ wb = ¯ wτ under CARA utility,
and so combining this equation with equation (9) gives our test for optimal beneﬁts:




(1 + εD,b). (10)
If the left-hand-side of equation (10) is larger than the right-hand-side, an increase in
beneﬁts has a big eﬀect on the reservation wage and hence on workers’ utility relative to the
tax cost, and so a small increase is welfare-improving.
Roughly speaking, the coeﬃcient D
αT+D represents the fraction of time that a worker
spends unemployed. More precisely, suppose we pay a worker 1/r each period she is un-
employed. If the worker starts oﬀ unemployed, the expected cost is D
αT+D. In the limit as
r → 0, αT → T, so this is just the fraction of time the worker spends unemployed, i.e. the
unemployment rate u ≡ D
T+D. At an optimum, a unit increase in unemployment beneﬁts
should raise the reservation wage by the unemployment rate times 1 plus the elasticity of un-
employment duration with respect to unemployment beneﬁts. If there is discounting, D
αT+D
is slightly larger than the unemployment rate, but in practice the diﬀerence is quantitatively
small.
5.2 Measurement
To implement the test proposed in Proposition 4, think of the time unit as a week and
set the interest rate at r = 0.001, equivalent to an annual interest rate of 5.1 percent.
We set expected unemployment duration at D = 10 weeks and the duration of a job at
T = 165 weeks, consistent with a 5.7 percent unemployment rate, the average value in
the U.S. since 1948. According to Meyer (1990, p. 779), the elasticity of the hazard rate
of ﬁnding a job with respect to beneﬁts is −0.88; since the hazard rate is the inverse of
expected unemployment duration, this implies εD,b = 0.88. This estimate is somewhat
larger than 0.5, which Krueger and Meyer (2002, p. 2351) call “not an unreasonable rough
summary” of the literature, and so provides a conservative bound for the cost of raising
unemployment beneﬁts.9 With εD,b = 0.88, the right hand side of equation (10) evaluates
9 The elasticity εD,b is partial, holding taxes constant, not the elasticity of duration with respect to an
increase in beneﬁts and a balanced-budget increase in taxes. Most of the theoretical literature has focused on
the latter concept, but our reading of the empirical literature suggests that it measures the partial elasticity
and so we deﬁne the elasticity that way here. In any case, interpreting Meyer’s estimates as a partial
elasticity is again the conservative choice. If they in fact give the impact of a balanced-budget change in
unemployment beneﬁts and employment taxes, ˆ εD,b = 0.88, one can show that the elasticity of duration
with respect to beneﬁts alone is slightly smaller, εD,b = ˆ εD,bαT/
￿
(1 + ˆ εD,b)D + αT
￿
= 0.78.
12to 0.116. Reasonable parameter changes do not much aﬀect this number. For example, if
unemployment duration is twice as long, D = 20, but job duration is also twice as long,
T = 330, so the unemployment rate is unchanged, the right hand side increases slightly to
0.125.
There are several studies that estimate the responsiveness of the reservation wage to
unemployment beneﬁts.10 In our view, none of these calculations is deﬁnitive. Instead, the
diﬀerent answers they provide point to the need for more precise estimates of the responsive-
ness of reservation wages to beneﬁts. Fishe (1982) uses the Continuous Wage and Beneﬁt
History ﬁles for Florida, a 5 percent sample of state residents from 1971 to 1974. He infers
the reservation wage from information on actual wages. His Table 2 shows that a $1 increase
in potential weekly beneﬁts raises the (unobserved) reservation wage by $0.44.
If this estimate is correct, there is a substantial gain from raising unemployment beneﬁts.
A $1 balanced-budget increase in unemployment beneﬁts raises the after-tax reservation wage
by
¯ wb(1 + τ
′(b)) − τ
′(b) =
¯ wb(αT + D) − D(1 + εD,b)
αT − DεD,b
,
or $0.37 using Fishe’s (1982) number for ¯ wb. Measuring utility in units of consumption,
this raises the welfare of all unemployed workers by the same amount as giving them 37
cents of additional consumption at all dates in the future, but the increase in unemployment
beneﬁts is revenue neutral. Put diﬀerently, there are about 135 million workers in the U.S.
economy, with about 7.7 million unemployed at any point in time. Raising unemployment
beneﬁts by $1 per week would cost approximately $400 million per year. This is equivalent to
(somehow) raising the consumption of all workers by $0.37 per week, at a cost of $2.6 billion
per year. Of course, even if these estimates are correct, they are only correct locally. Raising
beneﬁts by $1000 per week would probably not yield $2.6 trillion per year in additional
consumption-equivalent utility.
Another approach uses self-reported reservation wages. Feldstein and Poterba (1984)
study a supplement to the May 1976 Current Population Survey (CPS) that includes such
information. In their Table 4, they report that a 1 percentage point increase in the ratio
of unemployment beneﬁts b to the previous wage w0 raises the ratio of the reservation
wage ¯ w to the previous wage w0 by somewhere between 0.13 and 0.42 percentage points, so
¯ wb ∈ [0.13,0.42]. The lowest slope estimate is for job losers on layoﬀ and the highest is for
10 Early but indirect evidence that the reservation wage responds to unemployment beneﬁts comes from
Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976), who ﬁnd that workers who receive higher unemployment beneﬁts get higher
wage jobs.
13other job losers; the slope estimate for job leavers is 0.29. This study also therefore suggests
substantial gains from increasing unemployment beneﬁts. Curiously, Feldstein and Poterba
(1984) interpret their estimates of the responsiveness of reservation wages to beneﬁts as an
argument for lowering unemployment beneﬁts because of the moral hazard costs. Our model
shows that, on the contrary, if the reservation wage is suﬃciently responsive to beneﬁts, then
beneﬁts must be serving their purpose, improving the welfare of unemployed workers.
On the other hand, some more recent estimates of ¯ wb from other countries are smaller.
For example, a recent study by Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001) uses self-reported reserva-
tion wages for unemployed workers in the Dutch socio-economic panel from 1987 to 1990.
They report in their Table 4 that a 1000 Florin increase in unemployment income raises
the reservation wage of household heads by 4.4 percent and of spouses by 9.0 percent, al-
though the latter ﬁgure is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Since the mean reservation
wage is 1521 Florin for household heads and 828 Florin for spouses (see their Table 1), the
estimated value of ¯ wb is 0.07 for both groups. Taking this small estimate at face value, it
suggests that current beneﬁt levels are too high and that reducing beneﬁts by $1 is equivalent
to a permanent 5 cent increase in consumption. Of course, there are some problems with
this calculation since it compares estimates of the elasticity of unemployment duration from
the U.S. with estimates of the slope of the reservation wage function from the Netherlands,
a country with relatively high unemployment beneﬁts. Still, it clariﬁes the need for more
precise and up-to-date estimates of ¯ wb.
6 Extensions
We think the most attractive feature of the behavioral test for optimal unemployment insur-
ance is that, while it is theoretically well-grounded, it does not rely on much of the structure
of the model. For example, we have already shown that we do not need to know whether
workers have easy access to ﬁnancial markets or no access at all. In this section, we dis-
cuss several modiﬁcations of and extensions to our basic framework in order to establish
the robustness of our approach. Each of these modiﬁcations alters the formula for how the
reservation wage reacts to beneﬁts, but none of them substantially changes the behavioral
test in Proposition 4. To simplify the presentation we discuss each new element separately
and keep the mathematical formalities to a minimum.
146.1 Diﬀerent Interest and Discount Rates
To simplify the exposition we have assumed throughout that the interest rate is equal to the
discount rate. Fortunately, our characterization of optimal unemployment insurance does
not depend on the relationship between r and ρ. While the relationship between r and ρ
aﬀects consumption, it is easy to show that with CARA preferences the eﬀect is simply a
level-shift in consumption:




where γ is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion Therefore the objective of the unemploy-
ment insurance agency is still to maximizing the after-tax reservation wage subject to the
budget constraint in equation (7) and so the characterization in equation (10) is unchanged.11
6.2 Heterogeneity in Job Length
In our baseline model, we assumed that all jobs last for T periods and are heterogeneous
only in the wage opportunity. We now prove that our results easily extend to the case when
jobs diﬀer both in terms of their wage oﬀer and in terms of their duration.
Suppose that workers sample jobs distinguished by their wage-duration pair (w,T) from
some joint distribution function F(w,T). It is straightforward to prove that workers use a
reservation wage rule, accepting all jobs that pay at least ¯ w, independent of T. Intuitively, a
worker employed at her reservation wage is indiﬀerent about accepting the job and therefore
indiﬀerent about how long the job lasts. In particular, an unemployed worker with assets
a is indiﬀerent about accepting a job oﬀering her reservation wage forever, and therefore
consuming ra + ¯ w − τ forever. This pins the value of unemployment, unchanged from
equation (1) in the case with liquidity and equation (5) in the case of ﬁnancial autarky. In
both cases, a worker’s utility is still increasing in the after-tax reservation wage ¯ w − τ.
Optimal unemployment insurance maximizes the after-tax reservation wage subject the
resource constraint, a slight generalization of equation (7):
b
λ(1 − F(¯ w))
= E(αT|w ≥ ¯ w)τ,
where E(αT|w ≥ ¯ w) is the expected value of αT conditional on a wage draw exceeding the
reservation wage. If w and T are independent, E(αT|w ≥ ¯ w) = EαT, the unconditional
11 This argument ignores any possible general equilibrium eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts on interest
rates, a channel that we think is unlikely to be quantitatively important.
15expected value of αT, and so our behavioral characterization of optimal unemployment in-





In general, however, the expected value of αT depends on the reservation wage and hence on
beneﬁts and taxes. This leads to the following generalization of equation (10):
¯ wb =
D
ˆ α + D
(1 + εD,b − εˆ α,b), (11)
where ˆ α ≡ E(αT|w ≥ ¯ w) and εˆ α,b is the elasticity of ˆ α with respect to beneﬁts. For example,
if higher wage jobs last longer, an increase in beneﬁts raises both employment duration so
εˆ α,b > 0.
This equation is easy to interpret if r = 0 so ˆ α measures the average duration of an
employment spell, E(T|w ≥ ¯ w). Since the unemployment rate is D
E(T|w≥ ¯ w)+D and the em-
ployment rate is
E(T|w≥ ¯ w)
E(T|w≥ ¯ w)+D, the diﬀerence in elasticities, εD,b − εˆ α,b, is the elasticity of
the unemployment-employment ratio with respect to beneﬁts. If higher wage jobs tend to
last for longer, the increase in employment duration from an increase in beneﬁts oﬀsets the
increase in unemployment duration, reducing the relevant elasticity and raising the attrac-
tiveness of unemployment insurance. To our knowledge, the existing literature on optimal
unemployment insurance has neglected this possibility.
6.3 Job Loss Risk
To focus on the risk of unemployment duration we abstracted from job loss risk by assuming
that the duration of a job is known as soon as the job is accepted. In reality, of course,
workers do face uncertainty regarding job length, and would value insurance against the risk
of early separations.
If all job losses are exogenous—that is, if there is no form of moral-hazard involved—then
it is optimal to fully insure against these shocks. The right instrument to address this would
not be unemployment insurance, which pays some beneﬁt per period remaining unemployed,
but a lump-sum severance payment at the time of dismissal. The fact that unemployment
insurance is not the obvious instrument for this risk was part of our motivation for abstracting
from job loss risk in our baseline model. However, even in this case it may still be of interest
to understand the determinants of unemployment insurance when such severance payments
16are ruled out. Once again, our behavioral test is virtually unaﬀected.
To be concrete, suppose all jobs end according to a Poisson process with arrival rate
s. Since a worker earning her reservation wage is indiﬀerent about when her job ends, she
eﬀectively faces no uncertainty and therefore keeps her consumption and assets constant:
cs(a, ¯ w) = cu(a) = ra + ¯ w − τ. This pins down the value of unemployment, an increasing
function of the after-tax reservation wage with both ﬁnancial market structures.
The resource constraint changes slightly when job duration is uncertain, so equation (7)
becomes
b





Note that 1/(r+s) represents the expected present value of a unit of income until a job ends,
analogous to αT in the case of ﬁnite jobs. This modiﬁcation carries through the algebra until





(1 + εD,b). (12)
Setting r = 0.001, D = 10, s = 1/T = 1/165, and εD,b = 0.88, the right hand side evaluates
to 0.124, slightly larger than the 0.116 obtained when all jobs last for exactly T periods.
Indeed, the only diﬀerence between these numbers comes from discounting. If r = 0, D
T+D
and D
1/s+D are both equal to the unemployment rate.
Of course, we can also examine what happens when the hazard of job loss varies across
jobs. If w and s are independent, the expected value of 1/(r + s) enters the denominator
of equation (12). If they are correlated, the term in the denominator must condition on the
wage exceeding ¯ w and the relevant elasticity is that of the unemployment-employment ratio
with respect to beneﬁts, exactly as in the model without job loss risk.
6.4 Costly Search
We have so far focused on a worker’s choice of which jobs to accept as the source for the
moral-hazard problem. An alternative approach models workers as making a costly search
eﬀort choice that aﬀects the arrival rate of a homogeneous job opportunities. Reality likely
combines both elements; fortunately, so can our model.
To maintain the tractability of our CARA speciﬁcation with no wealth eﬀects on job
choices, we assume that the search eﬀort is monetary so that the utility function is u(c−v(e))
for some disutility of eﬀort function v(e), where e is eﬀort. Eﬀort improves the arrival of job
17opportunities λ(e).
With this speciﬁcation, workers optimally choose some constant level of eﬀort e∗, inde-
pendent of their wealth level. Eﬀectively this reduces unemployment income by v(e∗). While
this naturally alters the reservation wage equation (4), it does not alter the value of an un-
employed worker conditional on her reservation wage, which is unchanged from equation (1)
and equation (5). Similarly, the budget constraint equation (7) is unchanged by introduc-
ing search eﬀort, although one must recognize that the arrival rate of job oﬀers and the
reservation wage are both aﬀected by policy. The bottom line is that our main result is
unaﬀected by this modiﬁcation since all that matters for deriving equation (10) is the elas-
ticity of unemployment duration with respect to beneﬁts, not the reason why beneﬁts aﬀect
unemployment duration. Thus Proposition 4 is unchanged by a monetary cost of search.
6.5 Worker Heterogeneity
Up to this point we have considered the problem of an insurance agency confronted with
a single worker. Obviously, this problem is also of immediate relevance if there are many
identical workers. The analysis is also immediately applicable if there are many heteroge-
neous workers, and the agency can tailor the unemployment insurance design to each type
of worker. We now pursue a generalization that allows worker heterogeneity but assumes
that there can be only one unemployment insurance policy that applies to all worker types.
There are ﬁnitely many types of workers denoted by n = 1,2,...N with population
fractions πn. We allow the distribution of wages F n(w), the duration of jobs T n, and the
risk aversion parameter γn to depend on the worker type. To motivate our welfare crite-
rion, we assume worker types are observable and that lump-sum transfers are feasible. We
introduce lump-sum transfers to focus the problem on insurance rather than redistribution.
If lump-sum transfers were infeasible, unemployment beneﬁts have both an insurance and a
redistributive role, much like in an economy where some workers are initially employed and
some are initially unemployed. With lump-sum transfers across types and initial employ-
ment status, the objective is simply to maximize average consumption-equivalent welfare,





n − τ, (13)
where ¯ wn represents the reservation wage used by a type n.
18We require that the unemployment insurance agency’s budget balances when averaged
across types:




















are, loosely speaking, the average duration of unemployment and employment spells, weighted
to downplay workers who experience fewer unemployment spells, either because their unem-
ployment duration Dn or their employment duration T n and hence αn is longer.
In the special case of r = 0, αn = T n. Since type n workers spend a fraction un =







n=1(1 − un)πn =
ˆ u
1 − ˆ u
,
where ˆ u is the population unemployment rate. Thus ˆ D/ˆ α measures the employment-
unemployment ratio when r = 0.
To summarize, optimal policy consists of a choice of beneﬁts and taxes which maximizes
the average after-tax reservation wage in equation (13) subject to the budget constraint in









ˆ α + ˆ D
(1 + ε ˆ D,b − εˆ α,b), (15)
where ¯ wn
b is the derivative of the reservation wage of type n workers with respect to the
beneﬁt level b.
The left-hand-side of this equation uses the population weights πn and thus corresponds
to studies like Fishe (1982), who infers reservation wages from a representative sample of
Florida’s population. This is not necessarily equal to the average value of ¯ wn
b among unem-
ployed workers, the quantity that Feldstein and Poterba (1984) and Bloemen and Stancanelli
(2001) measure using self-reported reservation wages.
When there is no discounting, the right-hand-side of equation (15) only requires data on
the unemployment rate and its responsiveness to beneﬁts:
ˆ D
ˆ α + ˆ D
(1 + ε ˆ D,b − εˆ α,b) = ˆ u(1 + εˆ u,b − ε1−ˆ u,b),
19where εˆ u,b and ε1−ˆ u,b are the elasticity of the unemployment rate and the employment rate
with respect to beneﬁts. With a quantitatively reasonable amount of discounting, this ap-
proximation is likely to be close.
7 A Consumption-Response Test
The goal of this section is to link our model with existing tests for optimal unemployment
insurance which are based on the response of consumption to becoming unemployed (Baily,
1978; Gruber, 1997; Chetty, 2005). To do this, we return to the benchmark model of Section 2
and show how we can use the full structure to derive a test linking the decline in consumption
during an unemployment spell to risk aversion and the elasticity of unemployment duration
with respect to beneﬁts. Our exact test depends on whether workers have liquidity. If
they do, our test looks at the average drop in consumption during an unemployment spell.
In the hand-to-mouth model, our test examines the diﬀerence in consumption between an
unemployed worker and a worker employed at her reservation wage. It should be clear that
each of the extensions analyzed in Section 6 would potentially introduce further modiﬁcations
to our consumption-response tests since, in contrast to our behavioral test, these tests build
on the full structure of the model including the determinants of consumption and reservation
wages.
It is possible to derive other consumption-based tests that do not rely heavily on the
structure of the model, including ones which are identical in the hand-to-mouth and liquidity
cases (Chetty, 2005). Unfortunately, such tests tell us to compare the average lifetime
marginal utility of a worker when employed and when unemployed. To implement such tests,
we either need a very rich data set on the lifetime path of consumption for a large panel of
individuals or we have to make some implicit assumption about the economic environment
so that we can extrapolate the desired moments from a limited data set. In contrast, the
consumption tests we derive here use the full structure of an explicit model, including whether
workers have access to liquidity, to derive expressions with modest data requirements. Both
of these approaches highlight the need for implicit or explicit assumptions on the structure of
the model, especially workers’ ﬁnancial environment, which our behavior test largely avoids.
207.1 Workers with Liquidity
We start with the case when workers have access to ﬁnancial markets. In this case, our
consumption-response test relates the speed of decline in consumption to the elasticity of
unemployment duration with respect to unemployment beneﬁts:
Proposition 5 Assume workers have access to ﬁnancial markets. If unemployment beneﬁts


















where σ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion evaluated at the consumption level at the
start of the unemployment spell, σ = γcu(a0).
The proof is mostly algebraic. First, take the partial derivative with respect to b of both
sides of equation (4), holding ﬁxed the tax rate τ:




′(rαT(w − ¯ w))dF(w).
Since u′(c) = −γu(c), we can eliminate the integral using equation (4). Solving this expres-
sion for B = b + τ gives











Second, note that while a worker is unemployed, assets fall at rate ˙ a = ra+b−cu(a) = B− ¯ w,
where the second equality uses equation (2). Since a unit decrease in assets reduces cu(a)
by r, consumption falls linearly during an unemployment spell, ˙ cu = r(B − ¯ w). Substitute












This holds for any tax and beneﬁt policy. At the optimal policy, we can eliminate ¯ wb using
equation (10) to get








21Finally, if an unemployment spell lasts for t periods, the drop in consumption is ˙ cut. The
density of the duration of an unemployment spell is e−t/D/D, so the expected drop in con-





dt = D˙ cu.
Combining these equations gives the condition in Proposition 5.
As in most consumption-response tests, this optimality condition relates the average
decline in consumption to the elasticity of duration with respect to beneﬁts, but there are
some important diﬀerences: (i) we use the partial elasticity of unemployment duration with
respect to beneﬁts holding taxes ﬁxed, εD,b, whereas previous studies have considered the
eﬀect of a balanced budget increase in beneﬁts and taxes; (ii) the expression describes the
average decline in consumption during an unemployment spell; and (iii) the elasticity ex-
pression is somewhat diﬀerent than in previous work.
These points need clariﬁcation. First we use the partial elasticity holding taxes ﬁxed
because we believe this corresponds to the empirical evidence on the responsiveness of un-
employment duration to unemployment beneﬁts. For example, in response to policy experi-
ments, workers who receive higher unemployment beneﬁts are typically not expected to pay
higher subsequent taxes. Similarly, in cross-sectional data, workers who receive higher un-
employment beneﬁts do not typically pay proportionately higher taxes. In contrast, existing







where τ′(b) is the change in taxes required to keep the budget balanced. Of course, our
analysis fully incorporates the balanced-budget requirement. It is simply a question of how
the elasticity is deﬁned.
Turning now to point (ii), Baily’s (1978) original analysis and Gruber’s (1997) subsequent
work is based on a static analysis. These papers focus on the discrete drop in consumption
between employment and unemployment. For example, in his empirical implementation of
Baily’s (1978) test, Gruber (1997) uses PSID data to look at the drop in food consumption
for a worker who is employed in year t and unemployed in year t+1. In his dynamic analysis,
Chetty (2005) develops a version of Baily’s test that suggests looking at the diﬀerence in the
average marginal utility between employment and unemployment over the worker’s entire
22lifetime. Indeed, a similar condition can be derived for our model. Unfortunately, measuring
the required diﬀerence in marginal utilities is empirically impractical. That is, in general it
does not equal the consumption drop used in Gruber (1997), nor the average consumption
drop during unemployment required by our test.
Point (iii) is now easily explained. In these papers the optimality condition equates some
measure from consumption data to the elasticity of duration. Instead, we ﬁnd an expression
involving the elasticity, but not equal to it. As explained above, the consumption measures
diﬀer, so it should not be surprising that the optimality conditions call for equating these to
diﬀerent expressions involving the elasticity.
To implement this test, we plug the usual values r = 0.001, T = 165, D = 10, and εD,b =
0.88 into equation (16). In addition, assume that the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion at
the start of the unemployment spell is σ = 2. Then the model predicts that consumption
should decline by 25 percent during an unemployment spell if the unemployment beneﬁt
level is optimal. If instead the observed decline in consumption is smaller, a decrease in
unemployment beneﬁts would raise welfare.
We know of no direct evidence on the magnitude of the decline in consumption during
an unemployment spell, but there is some indirect evidence based on food consumption and
expenditure. Gruber (1997) reports that food expenditures fall by about 6.8 percent when
a worker is employed one year and unemployed the next. Aguiar and Hurst (2005) ﬁnd that
the unemployed spend 19 percent less on food than do the employed using cross-sectional
data; however, because of an increase in time spent on shopping and food preparation, this
translates into only a 5 percent drop in food consumption. Of course, since the income
elasticity of food consumption is less than 1, it seems likely that the expenditure on and
consumption of other goods declines more than this during an unemployment spell. In
addition, even if food consumption could proxy for total consumption, these measures do
not generally represent the average decline during a spell. We conclude that, after viewing
the available evidence through the lens of our consumption-response test, we are unsure
whether current beneﬁts are much too high, much too low, or just right, even if we are sure
workers have access to liquidity.
7.2 Hand-to-Mouth Workers
We now turn to hand-to-mouth workers. In this case, our test relates the diﬀerence in
consumption between a worker at the reservation wage, ¯ waut−τ, and an unemployed worker,
23b, to the elasticity of unemployment duration:
Proposition 6 Assume workers must consume their income in each period. If unemploy-
ment beneﬁts are chosen optimally, the diﬀerence between the consumption of an employed
worker at the reservation wage and the consumption of an unemployed worker is
1
γ
log(1 + εD,b) (17)
Equivalently, the percentage drop in consumption when a worker loses a job paying her




where σ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion evaluated at the consumption level of a
worker earning the reservation wage, ¯ waut − τ.


























The left-hand-side is zero if beneﬁts are chosen optimally, to maximize ¯ waut(b,τ(b)) − τ(b).
Then use equation (9) to eliminate τ′(b) from the right-hand-side:
u′(b)





where the denominator on the left-hand-side is the expectation of the marginal utility of
consumption conditional on the wage drawn from F exceeding ¯ waut.
Under CARA utility, this simpliﬁes further since the ratio of marginal utility is the same
as the ratio of utility,
u(b)





Since equation (6) implies
u(b)







24the previous two equations give
u(b)
u( ¯ waut − τ)
= 1 + εD,b.
Since u(c) = −e−γc, Proposition 6 follows immediately.
Once again, there are three important diﬀerences between our condition and most existing
formulas based on the response of consumption to unemployment: (i) we use the partial
elasticity εD,b; (ii) we use the diﬀerence between the lowest acceptable level of consumption
while employed and consumption while unemployed, rather than the average diﬀerence; and
(iii) the ﬁnal expression is slightly diﬀerent than in previous work, with log(1 + ε) rather
than ε.
Given the usual values of εD,b = 0.88 and σ = 2, the critical question in the hand-to-
mouth model is whether the consumption of a worker employed at her reservation wage
is 32 percent more than the consumption of unemployed workers. To measure this, we
need to know both the drop in consumption following unemployment and the worker’s
reservation wage. Data on food expenditures and consumption from Gruber (1997) and
Aguiar and Hurst (2005) suggest that many workers may be willing to take jobs which
raise their consumption by less than 32 percent, which suggests that workers are currently
over-insured. However, this conclusion depends strongly on the hand-to-mouth hypothesis;
Proposition 1 shows that if a worker with liquidity takes a job at her reservation wage, her
consumption is unchanged.
In our view, there are three drawbacks to the consumption-response tests we have pre-
sented here. The ﬁrst is that the moments of the consumption data that we should look
at depend on the structure of ﬁnancial markets. The second drawback is the unavailability
of reliable, high frequency consumption data for goods other than food. In contrast, the
behavioral test requires data on the responsiveness of reservation wages to unemployment
beneﬁts. This can either be measured using self-reported reservation wages or inferred from
the observed pattern of accepted wages. Finally, the behavioral test is robust to assump-
tions like the predictability of job loss and the extent of heterogeneity. Introducing these
modiﬁcations is likely to further change the consumption-response tests.
258 Conclusions
This paper argues that the after-tax reservation wage measures the well-being of unemployed
workers. Any policy that raises the average after-tax reservation wage is therefore beneﬁcial,
and the beneﬁt can be measured by the average increase in the after-tax reservation wage.
While we have applied this mainly to thinking about optimal unemployment insurance, the
insight is more general. For example, Proposition 3 shows that the after-tax reservation wage
encodes the value of liquidity. Going beyond this paper, when evaluating any policy towards
the unemployed—examples include severance payments, reemployment bonuses, training
subsidies, and job search centers—the key question is whether the policy raises the after-tax
reservation wage.
We have assumed CARA preferences throughout the body of this paper. This assumption
is convenient but probably not essential. Proposition 2 shows that the after-tax reservation
wage measures a hand-to-mouth worker’s welfare regardless of her preferences. Moreover, in
our companion paper Shimer and Werning (2005), we argue that the behavior of a worker
with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences is quantitatively similar to that of
a worker with CARA preferences and the same coeﬃcient of risk aversion if both workers
have access to liquidity. Indeed, our intuition for the proof of Proposition 1 explains why
this is true: the only reason the after-tax reservation wage would not measure the welfare
of an unemployed worker is if workers are willing to take jobs temporarily but not perma-
nently. While this is a theoretical possibility, we doubt that the phenomenon is quantitatively
important.
Finally, our paper implies that a key empirical issue is the responsiveness of the reserva-
tion wage to unemployment beneﬁts or other labor market policies. Some existing estimates
suggest that reservation wages are very responsive, implying huge gains from increasing
unemployment beneﬁt levels. Other estimates are much smaller and imply current beneﬁt
levels are too high. An important goal for future empirical research should be to obtain more
precise estimates of how labor market policies aﬀect reservation wages.
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A Proof of Proposition 1








where V (a,t,w) is the value of an employed worker with assets a, t periods remaining on
the job, and a wage w. We prove this for the general case where r and ρ are not necessarily






where the expectation is taken using all the information available when cs is chosen. With




Now consider the lifetime utility Vs at time s of a worker facing some stochastic future
















The second equation uses equation (19) while the third equation solves the integral.
Shape of the Consumption and Value Functions. The shapes of the consumption and
value functions follow immediately from equation (18). It is feasible for a worker with assets
a′ to consume ra′ more than a worker with assets 0 and vice-versa, assuming the two have
the same employment duration and wage. This implies
c(a,t,w) = ra + c(0,t,w). (20)
Next, consider two employed workers, one at a wage w and another at a wage w′. If each
has t periods remaining in his job, the present value (as of the end of the previous period)






−rsds ≡ αt(w − w
′).
If the present value diﬀerence happens to equal the diﬀerence in the two workers’ asset levels,
they have the same resources and will behave the same:
c(a,t,w) = c(a + αt(w − w
′),t,w
′).
Combining with equation (20) gives
c(a,t,w) = r
￿






Note that if the job is ﬁnished, t = 0 and α0 = 0, the worker is unemployed so c(a,0,w) =
c(a,0,w′) for all w and w′. It is convenient to deﬁne cu(a) ≡ c(a,0,w) as the consumption
of a worker who starts a period unemployed and Vu(a) ≡ V (a,0,w) be her value function.
Reservation Wage. Consider a worker who accepts a job at wage w. Her value function
is V (a,T,w) and so she takes the job if V (a,T,w) ≥ Vu(a). Using equation (18), this is
equivalent to c(a,T,w) ≥ cu(a), which by equation (20) implies a reservation wage rule,
independent of assets, satisfying
c(0,T, ¯ w) = cu(0). (22)
Combine equation (22) with equation (21), evaluated at w′ = ¯ w, to get a convenient expres-
sion for the consumption of a newly employed worker:
c(a,T,w) = r
￿
a + αT(w − ¯ w)
￿
+ cu(0). (23)
Behavior of the Employed. A worker who starts a period with t ≥ 0 periods remaining
in her job faces no uncertainty until the job ends and therefore keeps consumption constant.




where ˙ a(t) = ra + w − τ − c(a(t),t,w) is the rate of increase in assets. Diﬀerentiating gives
ca(a,t,w)
￿
ra + w − τ − c(a,t,w)
￿
= ct(a,t,w),
28where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Note from equation (21) that ca(a,t,w) = r, so
this is a diﬀerential equation for c as a function of t with terminal condition equation (23).
The solution is







rαT(w − ¯ w) + cu(0)
￿
(24)
This provides an alternate expression for c(a,0,w), which we know is equal ra + cu(0).
Simplifying this equality pins down the constant in the consumption function,
cu(0) = ¯ w − τ. (25)
Substituting equation (25) into equation (23) yields the consumption functions for unem-
ployed and employed workers found in equation (2) and equation (3), while substituting
these into equation (18) gives the value of an unemployed worker in equation (1). All that
remains is to determine the worker’s reservation wage.














where ˙ a = ra + b − cu(a) = B − ¯ w using equation (25). Since u′′(c) = −γu′(c) = γ2u(c) and
c′
u(a) = r, we can rewrite this as







Next, use u(c1)/u(c2) = −u(c1 − c2) and u(0) = −1 to get











Simplify using equation (23) yields equation (4). This completes the characterization of
worker behavior in Proposition 1.
29B Proof of Proposition 3
We start with two inequalities. At any w ≥ ˜ w,
−u(B − ˜ w) − 1 = exp(γ( ˜ w − B)) − 1 > γ( ˜ w − B),
1 + u(rαT(w − ˜ w)) ≥ rαT(1 + u(w − ˜ w)).
The ﬁrst equality uses the deﬁnition of u and the ﬁrst inequality uses convexity of the
exponential function. To prove the second inequality, note that 1 − y ≥ e−xy − ye−x when
x > 0 and y ∈ [0,1]. When x = 0, this is trivially true. Moreover, the derivative of the
right-hand-side with respect to x is y(e−x − e−xy). Since y ∈ [0,1] and x ≥ 0, x ≥ xy and
hence e−x ≤ e−xy, so the right-hand-side is decreasing in x. Hence the inequality holds for
any positive x. If x = γ(w − ˜ w) > 0 and y = rαT ∈ [0,1], this is equivalent to the desired
inequality.
Now suppose ¯ w solves equation (4). The previous inequalities imply









1 + u(w − ¯ w)
￿
dF(w).
It is easy to conﬁrm that the ﬁrst expression is decreasing in ¯ w and the last expression is
increasing, so the solution to
−u(B − ¯ w








requires ¯ waut < ¯ w. Under CARA utility, u(c1 + c2) = −u(c1)u(c2), so this is equivalent to
the reservation wage equation (6).
Finally, under ﬁnancial autarky, equation (5) shows that an unemployed worker’s utility is
u( ¯ waut−τ)/ρ. With access to ﬁnancial markets, equation (1) shows that it is u(ra+ ¯ w−τ)/ρ.
The worker is indiﬀerent to the scenarios if a = ( ¯ waut− ¯ w)/r, a reduction in assets that lowers
the worker’s consumption by ra = ¯ waut − ¯ w in every future period.
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